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1. The impact of Protest Responses in Choice Experiments 
In the last years, the assessment of environmental and recreational values with choice 
experiments (CE) has increased (Adamowicz et al., 1998; Boxall et al., 1996; Hanley et 
al., 1998; Morrison et al, 2002). The CE method is a generalization of the contingent 
valuation (CV) method, in the sense that rather than asking people to choose between a 
baseline scenario and a specific alternative, CE ask people to select between cases that 
are described by attributes (Adamowicz et al., 1998). CE share a common theoretical 
framework with dichotomous-choice contingent valuation in Random Utility Models 
(RUM) (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1974), as well as a common basis of empirical analysis 
with limited dependent variables (Greene, 1997). For these reasons, we look at the 
treatment of protest responses in CV, aiming to adopt it to CE.  
As the literature has shown, if protesting occurs, stated preference methods may fail to 
determine the correct economic value of the good in question (Meyerhoff and Liebe, 
2008). The treatment of protest responses becomes particularly important when the 
benefit aggregation issue is considered (Halstead et al., 1992), because such protests 
may provide underestimated welfare measures if all responses are included in the 
analysis (e.g. Hearne and Santos, 2005; Chuan-Zhong et al., 2004); or else, 
overestimated results if removal of all the status quo responses of the analysis is done 
(e.g. Adamowicz et al. 1998
3). Therefore, a correct analysis of protest responses seems 
required. 
                                                 
3 They remove individuals who selected always the current situation and were treated 
the same as the “I don’t know” response in a CV question. 3 
Protest responses have been widely debated in CV studies (Strazzera et al., 2003; 
Jorgensen et al., 1999, among others), showing that the identification and their later 
treatment may have a significant influence on the welfare estimates. Therefore, 
problems commonly encountered in CV related to protest responses might also be 
present in CE, although not much attention has been given to these issues yet in the 
literature.  
In CE, in addition to the different attribute combinations which are associated with 
some changes in the good or services valued, another option is typically presented to 
respondents that contains the current situation and a zero payment, denoted as the status 
quo option (Hearne and Santos, 2005; Mercer and Snook, 2004).  Protest responses may 
hide behind the selection of the status quo options (Adamowicz et al., 1998; Meyerhoff 
and Liebe, 2009).  Just in the last years, authors such as Meyerhoff and Liebe (2008, 
2009) treat more explicitly the topic of protest responses in CE.  Meyerhoff and Liebe 
(2008) employ a follow up question with CE and CV to differentiate the protest beliefs 
and responses, and to assess whether the likelihood of protest responses differs across 
methodologies. They do not find clear differences between protests responses in both 
methodologies. Meyerhoff and Liebe (2009) analyze the motives to select the status quo 
alternative. Furthermore, they assess the impact of the alternative specific constant for 
the status quo into the computation of compensating surplus.   
The novelty of the analysis that follows is that it is based on the treatment of protest 
responses, distinguishing explicitly between protest and non-protest responses based on 
the selection of the status quo option. In this way, the indirect utility function and the 
associated welfare estimates are computed per treatment.  Therefore, this analysis 4 
allows not only for the assessment of the impact of protest responses on the welfare 
estimates, but also on the estimated parameters of the indirect utility function. 
In order to properly account for the effect of protest responses, first, a conservative 
treatment of protests is employed, treating the protest responses in the analysis as true 
zero respondents. In a second approach, protest responses are excluded from the 
empirical analysis, under the assumption that individuals who do not share the valuation 
scenario should not be taken into account when estimating welfare estimates (Freeman, 
1986). As far as we know, this is the first empirical application that explicitly deals with 
the treatment of protest responses per se in the context of CE, analyzing two ways to 
identify the protests. At the same time, the identification of protesters follows the steps 
of the previous works conducted in CV but novel in CE studies.  Additionally, 
secondary objectives are related to the assessment of the sensitivity of welfare estimates 
when including and excluding protest responses, respectively. These analyses seem 
necessary due to the propensity to find protest responses in CE. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: first, we conduct a literature review of 
previous studies linked to protests responses and their treatment, continuing with the 
choice experiment model estimation. It follows with the description of the case study 
area and the survey mechanism. Later, we present and compare the results for the whole 
sample with the results corrected by protests responses, ending with some conclusions 
and recommendations based on the obtained results. 
2.  Analysis of Protest Responses 
Protest respondents are those who oppose or do not approve the survey mechanism and 
fail to respond the valuation question, either giving positive responses although invalid, 5 
or a non-true zero value to a product or service (Halstead et al., 1992). Nevertheless, the 
first concern of protest responses appears with respect to their identification. There is no 
protocol or theoretical criterion for classifying responses (Boyle and Bergstrom 1999); 
however, the classification of all zero bids must be carefully examined to identify the 
legitimate zero and protest responses. To differentiate between them, previous analyses 
have used a set of debriefing questions that were presented to those respondents who 
were unwilling to pay (Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2008
4, Loomis et al., 1996, Strazzera et 
al., 2003). Based on statements as the previously used in the literature, and presented in 
Table 1, real zero values and protest responses were also identified in this analysis.   
 
Table 1 around here 
As we can observe in Table 1, there are differences related to the presented statements 
aiming to classify individuals, but also with respect to the criteria applied to identify a 
response as protest. Some authors presented the statements to the full sample 
(Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2008), trying to distinguish not only protest responses related to 
zero WTP values, but also general protests beliefs in the entire sample. On the contrary, 
other studies only presented statements to the individuals who were not willing to pay 
(Halstead et al., 1992; Loomis et al., 1996). Furthermore, the criteria to be classified 
between protests and true zero values varied considerably between different authors, as 
denoted in Table 1, although there are some commonalities across studies. Halstead et 
al. (1992) present four statements, including reasons for the rejection of the payment 
vehicle, the concept of paying for the good or the impossibility to afford the payment, 
                                                 
4 They presented these follow-up questions to all individuals in the sample, not only 
those do not willing to pay. 6 
and in addition an open ended question. Along the same line, the rest of the authors 
include other reasons related to the value of the good, the sense that others should pay 
for the program, or that they cannot afford the payment.  Giraud et al. (2002), Jakobsson 
and Dragun (2001), Loomis et al. (1996), Strazzera et al. (2003) differentiated between 
true zero and protest responses, according with the statements of Table 1. The italics 
denote the statements identifying protest respondents, while the rest are classified as 
true zeros. 
Once the protesters had been identified, different treatments were applied to the protest 
responses in the CV literature. Generally, there have been three main ways of dealing 
with protest zero bids (Halstead et al., 1992).  The first consists on eliminating them 
from the data set (Freeman, 1986; Mitchell and Carson, 1989). The second includes the 
protest bids in the data set and treats them as legitimate zero bids (Giraud et al., 2002).  
The third method assigns protest bidders mean WTP values based upon their socio-
demographic characteristics, relative to the rest of the sample. Thus, as the literature 
shows, both the treatment and identification of protest responses have been quite 
different across studies. 
Even though there are different ways to deal with protest responses, the most common 
application in CV is to delete them from the sample (see Adamowicz et al., 1998; 
Morrison, et al., 2000). Strazzera et al. (2003) argue that the rationale for removal of 
protest zeros is explained by Freeman´s (1986) with the following statement: “The 
person who refuses to state a monetary value on the grounds that it is unethical to do so 
or that he has an inherent right to the environmental good must be dropped from the 
sample when mean bids are calculated. If a person bids zero on the grounds that he had 
an inherent right to the good, the bid is not an indicator of his true valuation”. However 7 
Jorgensen and Syme (2000) considered that protest beliefs were representative of 
attitudes towards the valuation process and argued that censoring of protest responses is 
unjustified.  In the present application, we use CE for the valuation of various 
managements programs to be applied in a natural protected area.  
 
 
3.  Choice Experiments and Estimation 
Choice experiment methods are consistent with utility maximization and demand theory 
(Bateman et al., 2002). Respondents are asked to choose between different bundles of 
(environmental) goods, which are described in terms of their attributes, or 
characteristics, and the levels that these take.  
According to this framework, the individual i has a utility function (U) of the form: 
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 (1) 
This indirect utility function can be described as a sum of two components: a 
deterministic part (V) and a stochastic part (ε). The first element is a function of the 
attributes of the different management programs (X) to be valued and the social 
characteristics (S) of the individuals. β  is a vector of parameters to be estimated and αj 
is another vector of parameters corresponding with the j-th alternative to be selected. 
The stochastic element represents unobservable factors on individual choices 
independent of the deterministic part.  8 
A person chooses the alternative k when  ik ij uu >  for all k ≠ j . Accordingly, with J 
choices, the probability of choice k is: 
() PP ik ij choose k u u for all k j ⎛⎞ => ≠ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
           
(2) 
One of the prevalent models used in the previous literature to model choice behavior has 
been the multinomial logit. An assumption of this model is that the error term is 
independently and identically distributed (IID). The non-fulfillment of IID implies 
violations in the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. This property 
states that the ratio of choice probabilities between two alternatives in a choice set is 
unaffected by changes in that choice set. In order to test for IID/IIA violations, a 
Hausman-McFadden test was conducted
5, which involves the construction of a 
likelihood ratio test around different specifications of the same model where choice 
alternatives are excluded. A 
2 χ value of 75.14 was computed for a conditional logit 
model when ‘‘Option B’’ alternative was excluded from the choice set. This value 
exceeds the critical value (which from the Chi-squared table at 5% significance level 
                                                 
5 The statistic for this procedure is given by the following equation:  
1
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where  
)
β indicates the coefficient vector, 
)
∑denotes the estimated covariance matrix, and 
f  and s  respectively the full and reduced choice specifications. This statistic follows a 
limiting chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is the number of 
attributes. 9 
with 5 degrees of freedom is 11.07). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, 
indicating an IIA problem.    
When a violation of the IIA hypothesis is observed, more complex statistical models are 
necessary in order to relax the assumptions employed. These include the multinomial 
probit model (MNP) (Chen and Cosslett, 1998; Hausman and Wise, 1978; Lusk and 
Schroeder, 2004), the random parameters logit model (Revelt and Train, 1998; Train, 
1998; Train, 2003), the nested logit (Louviere et al., 2000), and the heterogeneous 
extreme value logit (Allenby and Ginter, 1995; Bhat, 1995; Lusk and Schoroeder, 
2004).  
The approach that we follow in this analysis is the MNP. The MNP assumes that the 
error term follows a multivariate normal distribution, with mean 0 and covariance 
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Hausman and Wise (1978) proposed the structured covariance matrix for this model to 
consider heterogeneity among individuals. Note that allowing the error variance to 
differ across alternatives while errors are normally distributed is equivalent to relax the 
restrictive IIA assumption.  
When the errors are correlated, Train (2003) shows that the parameters in ∑ are not 
identified unless constraints are imposed. These constraints are linked to the fact that 
neither adding nor dividing a constant to the utility for each alternative will affect the 
choice that is made according to equation (2). Then, we have to normalize the model to 10 
eliminate the irrelevance effects of the base level and scale of utility. To remove the first 
effect, we use the resulting utility from taking the difference between each alternative’s 
utility and the utility of the base alternative, in this case k. This means that: 
ijk ij ijk
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(4) 
where j* = j if j < k and j* = j – 1 if j > k, so that j*= 1, ... , J-1. Now, we can work with 
the J-1 () × J-1 ()  covariance matrix ∑ for  ( )
* ,..., ii 1i , J - 1 ∈=∈ ∈ . For the second effect, we 
fix the value of one of the variances
6 
2
m σ  of  ∑. Thus, there are a total of at most 
JJ - 1 () 2 −1 identifiable variance-covariance parameters. If each individual is a utility 
maximizer, the probability that individual i chooses alternative k from a choice set to 
any alternative J, can be expressed as: 
   





















              
(5) 
More specifically the probabilities are written as: 
                                                 
6 We fit the model using STATA 10. By default, this program fixes one of the variances 
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where  () f ⋅  is the probability density function of the multivariate normal distribution. 
4.  Data 
In this study, we analyze different management alternatives in the Spanish Biosphere 
Reserve: Eo, Oscos y Terras de Burón. This Biosphere Reserve is an area in the 
Northwest of the country on the scenic Cantabrian coastline between. In this reserve, the 
Eo River estuary is an internationally recognized wetland under the RAMSAR treaty 
and has sustainable development plans for its rational management. Livestock, forestry, 
and tourism are currently the area’s main economic activities. Biosphere reserves are 
designed to bring together a broad range of actors to work cooperatively towards 
common objectives (UNESCO, 2005). In total, there are 553 Biosphere reserves 
worldwide in 107 countries (UNESCO, 2009). 
The designation of a Reserve does not carry any legal implications, although the 
establishment of different actions to integrate biodiversity conservation and economic 
development is expected. For policy purposes, the understanding of different 
interventions is relevant, given that policymakers need to ensure better integration of 
diverse community interests. With this objective in mind, we designed a choice 
modeling survey that was presented to 453 individuals, from which 276 live inside the 
Reserve and 177 in neighborhood areas. The survey was conducted face to face between 
November 2008 and March 2009.  The sample was restricted to individuals 18 years 12 
and older. The number of surveys in each city and village was determined by 
proportional sampling weights.   
The structure of this survey followed others previously conducted with similar 
objectives. Its first part collected participant’s opinions about different social problems 
and whether they visited the Reserve. The second section provided information to 
participants about the Biosphere Reserve, to continue with additional questions about 
the participant’s degree of approval with this designation, and various perception types 
of questions with respect to some of the management actions presented. Then, the 
different choice sets were presented, containing each two alternative programs and the 
status quo option. We have included a status quo option, not only to differentiate 
between protest and non-protest, but also because one of the options must always be in 
the respondent’s currently feasible choice set in order to be able to interpret the results 
in standard welfare economic terms (Hanley et al., 2001). In choice modeling, most 
researchers have included the alternative “do nothing” or status quo (Adamowicz et al., 
1994; Adamowicz et al., 1997; Hearne and Santos, 2005, Blamey et al., 2000), although 
others have not (Holmes et al., 1998, Mackenzie, 1993).  
Table 2 describes the different attributes and the corresponding levels used in the 
valuation scenario. The contained attributes are: reforestation actions, river and salmon 
conservation actions, patrimonial and architectural restoration actions, and finally the 
associated cost representing an increase on the current income tax level.  
 
Table 2 around here 
These attributes and levels were designed following the guidelines of the Biosphere 
Reserve Councils. In order to test the understanding of survey participants, a pretest was 13 
conducted among 40 participants. Furthermore, and following the previous CV 
literature, when the individuals selected the status quo option, follow up questions were 
presented to identify if their no-votes were protests or real zeros. The set of presented 
statements are displayed in Table 3, using the most common statements from previous 
studies and an open-ended question recommended by some authors (Bateman et al., 
2002).  
 
Table 3 around here 
Finally, the last part of the survey contained ethical and socio-economic questions about 
the respondent’s characteristics. Employing the criteria presented in Table 3, we have 
identified different answers, which are displayed in Table 4. Using these results, we 
have classified as "protest responses" those individuals who did not like the actions 
presented, were not willing to pay more taxes, or who considered that they should not 
have to pay for this type of program. In order to investigate the importance of these 
protest responses, three classifications were attempted. On one hand, protest responses 
were treated as zero respondents, and included into the dataset. Secondly, protest 
responses were differentiated via the presented statements at each choice occasion, and 
excluded from the sample; while in the third treatment, individuals providing any of the 
protest reasons in any of the choice occasions were excluded from the sample. 
Therefore, we have estimated three alternative models, one with the full sample with the 
protest responses treated as true zeros; a second with protests classified by each choice 
sets and excluded, and a third one, where in order to avoid inconstancies, responses 
coming from the same individual were classified all as protests or not.  
 14 
Table 4 around here 
5.  Results 
In total, 453 surveys were collected with an overall response rate of 40.27%. Each 
individual responded to six choice occasions that amount to a total of 2718 
observations. Surveys were conducted inside and outside the protected area, from a 
sample of the general population. Table 5 summarizes the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the sample. 
 
Table 5 around here 
The empirical representation of the utility function has the following functional form: 
a,b 1 2 3 4 5 a b V = Forest+ River+ Wolf+ Patrimony+ Tax+ , β βββ β α α +
            
(7) 
where  a α  and  b α  represent respectively the specific constants for selecting option A 
and B respectively, with respect to the status quo (choice C).  Table 6 presents the 
results from this baseline model estimated with the sample. In this model, all the 
attributes, except river, are statistically significant. The attributes forest, wolf and 
patrimony have a positive sign, while the coefficient corresponding with the required 
tax payment carries a negative one, as expected. This implies that the presence of the 
former attributes increases utility, while the latter attribute decreases utility in a 
statistically significant way.  
 
Table 6 around here 15 
An extended model has been also estimated by introducing different socio-demographic 
characteristics. With this extension, we can further analyze how individual 
characteristics affect choice selection, so that the impact of socio-economic variables is 
analyzed with respect to the status quo and choice of any of the two proposed programs.  
In this case, the utility function is represented by the following expression:  
a,b 1 2 3 4 5 a1
a2 a3 a4 a5 b1
, b2 b3 b4 b5
V = Wolf+ Patrimony+ River+ Forest+ Tax+ Reserve
Farmer Age NoDegree Reserve
Farmer Age NoDegree
β ββ β β α
αα α α α
αα α α
+
++ + + +
++ +
          
(8)
 
where the included socio-demographic variables are: Reserve, denoting whether the 
surveys were carried out inside the Biosphere Reserve; Farmer, denoting that the 
respondent was a farmer; Nodegree, representing individuals with the lowest education 
level, and finally, age, providing information about the respondents’ age (age).  
This extended specification improves the model’s goodness of fit. A log-likelihood ratio 
test has been performed being the null hypothesis that all coefficients of the additional 
variables are zero( )
2
0.01,8 LR=316.46, =20.09 χ rejected.  The results (table 6) show that 
when the individual is a farmer, the utility linked to the selection of an alternative 
different from the status quo decreases. The same occurs when the individual has low 
education, older age, or was interviewed inside the Biosphere Reserve.  With respect to 
the attributes’ coefficients, their significance levels and corresponding signs are 
maintained. The only difference is the forest attribute significance level, which 
increases from 10% to 1% significance level in this extended model.  16 
5.1. Identification of protest responses 
As denoted, among the respondents who choose the status quo, we have identified the 
protesters using the statements of table 3.  We found that 53.9% of the individuals chose 
the status quo in some occasion, and 37.3% always chose the status quo. Nearly 47% of 
the total sample selected, in some choice occasion, made a statement that was classified 
as protest response, and about 35% of the individuals were considered as protest in all 
of their choices. The most important reason behind the protest responses is related to the 
fact that participants consider that they are paying already enough taxes, while the true 
zeros usually are not able to afford the payment for the program. We have classified the 
protest responses by both individual and by choice sets. Through these classifications, 
we have identified as protests, on the one hand, 1055 choices sets and, on the other, 212 
individuals who in some of their elections have provided protest reasons. This fact 
shows that in most occasions, when the status quo is chosen, this can be classified as a 
protest response. Results are presented in table 4. In the next section, we compare 
results according to the outlined classification.  
5.2. Results with and without protest responses 
Two additional MNP models for the corrected samples were estimated (table 7). When 
classifying protest responses at the individual level, the sample is reduced to 241 
individuals, affecting 1445 choice sets, while if the protesters are classified based on 
choice sets, the remaining sample contains 1662 choice sets. The first two columns 
show the results corresponding with the sample corrected by individual protest 
responses, while the next correspond with the sample corrected by choices sets 
protesters. The results show that the difference between both sets of estimates is mainly 17 
related to the significance of the attribute patrimony and the tax level, which are 
statistically significant at the 0.1% and 1% significance level respectively, for the 
sample corrected by choices set protests, and at the 10% significance level if the sample 
is corrected at the individual level. The wolf and forest attributes have a positive effect 
on the utility of individuals in both cases, while the attribute tax has a negative and 
significant effect. In addition, in the entire sample, the river attribute is not significant, 
although positive. 
 
Table 7 around here 
Comparing the results between both corrected samples and the full sample, we can 
observe that there are no significant differences related to the magnitude and 
significance levels of the coefficients, except those denoting the selection of alternatives 
A and B with respect to the status quo. In the previous results employing the entire 
sample these coefficients are not statistically significant. This implies that selection of a 
particular alternative A or B does not increase the individual’s utility over the status quo 
option. Nevertheless, in the corrected samples, these alternative indicators are positive 
and statistically significant at the 0.1% level, showing statistical evidence that when an 
individual chooses an alternative in which some actions are carried out, her/his utility 
increases with respect to the status quo option. In terms of statistical fit, the corrected 
models have also improved notably, minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).  
5.3.  WTP Estimates   18 
WTP estimates are computed with the formula in (9), while asymptotic standard errors 
were obtained via the delta method for each attribute (table 8). The mean WTP for each 
attribute was estimated as the ratio of the coefficient associated with the attribute of 
interest over the Tax coefficient (see Hanemann and Kanninen 1999)
7. Each of these 
ratios is understood as a price change associated with a unit increase in a given attribute: 
attribute
tax
β WTP -1   β
⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠                                 
(9)  
 
Tabla 8 around here
                        
When excluding the protest responses, WTP estimates are not significantly different 
across models.  In fact, observing the confidence intervals, we can conclude that all the 
intervals overlap. On average, the respondents of the entire sample are willing to pay 
19.1 €/year for rehabilitation and restoration programs of patrimonial elements, while if 
we exclude the protest responses, the corresponding WTP estimate reaches 20.96 
€/year, and 21.22 €/year, respectively for the corrected sample by individual and 
corrected choice sets protest. Finally, the wolf protection program has an associated 
WTP of 10.97 €/year for the full sample and 17.54 €/year and 11.72 €/year without 
individual and choice set protest responses. The lowest positive WTP is estimated for 
the reforestation policy, ranging from 1.55 € for the total sample, and 1.60 €/year for the 
sample corrected by individual protesters, and 1.43 €/year when corrected for choice 
sets protests. To conclude, we can observe subtle differences with respect to the WTP 
                                                 
7 Following Lusk et al. (2003), we have multiplied by two the river, wolf and patrimony 
coefficients, because of effects coding. 19 
estimates for actions to be implemented in the Reserve according to the treatment of 
protest responses, only in the case of wolf protection when the sample is corrected by 
individual protesters, the confidence interval does not overlap with the other cases. 
6.  Conclusions  
In this research, we investigate the effects of protest responses in the results of a CE 
exercise and the sensitivity of the derived WTP estimates. We estimate models 
corrected and not corrected by protest responses, as well as an extended model with 
socio-demographic characteristics by choice alternative. As far as we know, this is one 
of the few applications using a multinomial probit model for modeling choice behavior. 
The protest responses were classified by two rules, one at the individual level, and a 
second one, considering them at the choice occasion level. The results show some 
quantitative differences across treatments of protest responses. With respect to the 
empirical objective at hand, we show the necessity that protest responses are identified 
in choice experiment, given that the statistical model fit improves considerably, 
providing more consistent results with the underlying economic theory. When the 
sample is corrected by protest, the utility of selecting any of the alternatives versus 
selecting the status quo, increases as expected according to individual’s rationality. 
Therefore, the corrected models are more consistent with economic theory. In addition, 
the valuation of some attributes, such as the wolf protection program vary slightly in 
terms of welfare estimates, denoting that the presence of this attribute in the choice set 
may trigger some protest responses. This finding makes sense in a geographical area 
where wolf protection unleashes controversy.  
In the context of contingent valuation, Halstead et al. (1992) show that the exclusion of 
protest responses may bias WTP results, but the direction of such bias is indeterminate a 20 
priori. However, the majority of the studies indicate that samples without protest 
bidders will result in higher WTP estimates (Jakobsson and Dragun 2001). The same 
result has been found in this study employing CE. Therefore, estimation of WTP values 
considering protest responses is necessary and can provide a range of estimates 
producing more accurate results. At the same time, it seems that the identification of 
protest responses should be done at the individual level instead of the choice level. In 
terms of statistical accuracy, a better model fit can be confirmed for the corrected 
protest model. Future research should therefore identify and treat protest responses in 
the context of CE.  21 
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Table 1. Examples of Statements Presented to Differentiate Between True Zeros 
and Protest Responses in Different Studies  
Giraud et al. (2002)   Halstead et al. (1992) 
The expanded Steller sea lion program is not 
worth this much money to me 
I am not willing to pay this amount, but I 
would be willing to pay $  
It is unfair to expect me to pay for the 
expanded Steller sea lion program 
I believe that the expanded Steller sea lion 
program will not help preserve this species 
I do not want additional restrictions placed on 
commercial fishing in this area 
I am opposed to paying for more government 
programs 
The loss to the coastal Alaskan communities 
and their economic livelihood is too large 
The length of payment is too long; Other 
The amount is too much; I would donate $__ 
per year over the next five year (please write in 
the maximum dollar amount that you would 
contribute) 
The bald eagle should be preserved on New 
England but the money should come from 
taxes and licenses fees (from game species) 
instead donations 
The bald eagle is not worth anything to me 
Bald eagle preservation is important to me but 
I refuse to place a dollar value on it 
Other, please explain 
Jakobsson and Dragun (2001)  Loomis et al. (1996) 
The amount given is too high, but I would pay 
$_ per year 
I did not want to put a dollar value on 
protecting plants and animals 
Society has more important problems than 
protecting plants and animals 
Protecting plants and animals is not worth 
anything to me 
The government should protect plants and 
animals using taxes already paid 
Not enough information is given. I object to 
the way the question is asked 
I can’t afford to pay anything 
Other 
This program is not worth anything to me 
I cannot afford to pay at this time 
I do not think program would work 
It is unfair to expect me to pay 
I am opposed to new government programs 
Fire is natural and benefits forest 
Other 
Meyerhoff and Liebe (2008)  Strazzera et al. (2003) 
I already pay enough for other things 
Lower Saxony should cut public spending on 
other things instead of expecting a voluntary 
contribution from me 
It is m y right to hav e a high level of forest 
biodiversity and not something I should have 
to pay extra for 
I refuse to assess nature in monetary terms 
Those who enjoy biodiversity in forests should 
pay for the measures 
I do not have enough information about forest 
conversion 
Recreational benefits stemming from the forest 
were not enough to warrant any payment 
Budget constraints impose a restriction on 
additional expenses 
The method of payment (entry charge) is 
considered inappropriate 
It is unfair to charge for recreation in that 
forest 
 
Note: Meyerhoff and Liebe (2008): rated the statements with a five-point scale, from 
completely disagree (1) to completely agree (5). 28 
 
Table 2. Attributes, levels and status quo 
Attribute (Variable)  Levels   Status quo 
5% increment on 
forest or 5400ha  
Forest program (Forest) 
20% increment on 
forest or 21000ha  
0 ha  
Yes, if cleaning and 
restoration actions are 
undertaken  
River and salmon program (River) 
No, otherwise 
No  
yes , if rehabilitation 
of architectural 
cultural heritage is 
undertaken  
Rehabilitation patrimonial program 
(Patrimony) 
 
No, otherwise  
No  
Yes, if management 
actions for wolf 
recovery is undertaken 
Wolf program management (Wolf) 
No, otherwise  
No 
15 € increment on tax 
over current levels 
30 €  
Tax (Tax) 
50 €  
0 €  29 
 
Table 3. Statements Presented to Differentiate Between True Zeros and Protest 
Response in Our Survey 
These actions are interesting, but nowadays I can’t afford this payment 
I don’t like the actions to be undertaken (Why?):  
It is not fair that I have to pay to protect the Biosphere Reserve, because I pay enough taxes 
already 
Another reason (indicate):  
 30 
 
Table 4. Number of Observation per Stated Motives 




These actions are interesting, but nowadays I can’t 
afford the payment 
482 87  No 
I don’t like the presented actions (Why?)      No 
I don´t like the different combinations  32  19  No 
I don´t like the different levels 5  2  No 
I don’t like a specific action such as wolf recovery 
or forest restoration 
97 38 Yes 
It is not fair that I have to pay to protect the 
Biosphere Reserve, because I pay enough taxes 
952 177  Yes 
Other reason (indicate)      No 
Too expensive 18  16  No 



















































































































Table 6. Results for Baseline Model and Expanded Model. Entire Sample  
Baseline model  Extended model 









































































Log simulated-likelihood  -2628.6962  -2470.4682 
AIC 5275.392  4974.936 
BIC 5338.446  5094.037 
Wald test  15.26  268.68 
p-value 0.0093  0.000 
Individuals 453  453 
Observations 8154  8151 
Number of choices sets  2718  2717 
Variable Definition:   
Reserve 
=1 if surveys were carried out inside the Reserve; =0 if 
outside 
Farmer 
=1 if respondents are ranchers, farmers or forest owners; 
=0 other 
Age  Age of respondent 
No degree 
=1 if respondents have formal educational levels below 
primary studies; = 0 otherwise 
Note: ***, **, * = Coefficients significantly different from zero at 0.1%; 1%; and 10% 
significance level. 34 
 














(0.014)  1.94* 
0.034 

































Log simulated-likelihood  -1107.1048  -1247.3967 
AIC 2232.21  2512.793 
BIC 2289.58  2571.423 
Wald test  9.38  23.45 
p-value 0.095  0.0003 
Individuals 241  296 
Observations 4335  4986 
Number of choices sets  1445  1662 
 35 
 
Table 8. Willingness to Pay Estimates for the Three Samples 





  WTP  95% C.I.  WTP  95% C.I.  WTP  95% C.I. 
Forest  1.55  (1.36, 1.75)  1.60  (1.37,1.82)  1.43  (1.17, 1.69) 
Wolf  10.97  (8.76, 13.17)  17.54  (15.16, 19.92) 11.72  (9.16, 14.27) 
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